expressed through a collective public vocabulary (Andsager 2000; Condit 1990 ). How collective vocabularies are constructed is consequential since these vocabularies exert influence on actors' understandings of what actions are legitimate and appropriate.
The process by which the meaning of events is socially constructed and negotiated has been primarily addressed in two related yet largely separate literatures. The first, known as the framing perspective, focuses on the processes by which actors produce frames of meaning to mobilize support for their respective positions (Klandermans 1992; Benford 1988, 1992; Snow et al. 1986) .
A second literature, generally referred to as the sensemaking perspective, emphasizes the social psychological and epistemological processes by which actors form an understanding of the situations they find themselves in (Morgan, Frost, and Pondy 1983; Weick 1995 Weick , 1999 . In this paper, we suggest that the framing perspective can be fruitfully extended by incorporating some of the insights from the sensemaking approach. While framing focuses on how different meanings compete for support, sensemaking stresses how the identification of patterns of meaning depends on salient cues from the environment (Weick 1999) . Incorporating insights from the sensemaking literature better enables frame analysis to include both how meaning is contested in discourse and how structural factors prompt and bound the emergence of such discourse. We use the example of globalization to show how discursive framing of globalization presents a crucial struggle over the legitimacy of change, and that this framing is the outcome of a process that combines both material change and symbolic construction. 2 
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The concept of framing captures the processes by which actors influence the interpretations of reality among various audiences. 3 Frames constitute "schemata of interpretation" that "organize experiences and guide action" (Snow et al. 1986:464) , providing coherence to a set of idea elements (Benford 1993; Ferree et al. 2002) . This process of giving meaning is fraught with conflict, as interested actors and entrepreneurs articulate particular versions of reality to potential supporters, bystanders, media, and targets of change (e.g., Coles 1998; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Haines 1996) . Frame disputes are inherent to public discourse, erupting especially when events undermine hegemonic interpretations of reality (Benford 1997; Coles 1998; Swidler 1995) . The concept of frame disputes thus "represents society and culture as contested terrain and depicts various social groups and movements as struggling for power" (Kellner 1992:58) . Furthermore, while the dynamics of frame contests are important in their own right (Gamson and Modigliani 1989) , the outcomes of these contests frequently have profound consequences for policy formation (Andsager 2000; Ferree et al. 2002; Gamson 1988; Hilgartner and Bosk 1988; Pan and Kosicki 1993) .
Within the social movements literature, concern has been recently expressed about studies of framing that focus almost exclusively on meaning construction but fail to connect to the structural context in which this meaning-making occurs (Bartholomew and Mayer 1992; Benford 1993 Benford , 1997 Diani 1996; Ellingson 1995; Kubal 1998) . In response to this concern, several researchers working in the framing perspective have aimed to show how frames are embedded in historical and material contexts (Ferree et al. 2002; Oliver and Johnston 2000; Steinberg 1999) . It thus appears much may be gained from moving toward an approach that sees struggles over meaning as not exclusively the outcome of processes "in the sphere of symbolic codes," but as also shaped by larger eco-nomic and political structures (Bartholomew and Mayer 1992:152) . Such an approach would aim to integrate social structure and culture more closely and thereby explore how and when opportunities for meaning creation open up and how this affects subsequent discursive processes.
To establish such an approach, better linking these structural and cultural elements, we draw on the sensemaking perspective (Wagner and Gooding 1997; Weick 1995; . By "sensemaking" we mean a response to events in which "people develop some sort of sense regarding what they are up against, what their own position is relative to what they sense, and what they need to do" (Weick 1999:42) . As Weick suggests, "The basic idea of sensemaking is that reality is an ongoing accomplishment that emerges from efforts to create order and make retrospective sense of what occurs " (1993:635) . Actors are thus "theorists of a pragmatic sort" (Levinson 1983; White 2000) ; they self-consciously develop notions about cause and effect, thus "theorizing" their world and the relationships within it (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Strang and Meyer 1993) . In sensemaking, actors creatively arrange and reassemble cues that they get from the "real" world, providing structure and guidance in an ongoing process of reality enactment (Neuman 1990; Weick 1995) . These sensemaking processes are bounded by the discursive fields in which the actors operate and are affected by structures and events "beyond the noosphere of information" (Steinberg 1999:772) .
Sensemaking and framing are conceptually compatible. In fact, some key works in the framing tradition acknowledge or implicitly assume that framing involves some aspects of sensemaking. For example, Gamson and Modigliani (1989:3) state that frames are the central, organizing idea for "making sense of relevant events." Similarly, Gitlin (1980:7) argues that media frames "organize the world both for journalists who report it and . . . for us who rely on their reports." Gamson et al. (1992:385) observe that frames bring order to events because they "make the world make sense."
Like framing, the concept of sensemaking implies that the world does not come to us in "raw form," but that we actively construct it, often using pre-fabricated vocabularies or schemas (Benford 1993; Gamson et al. 1992 ).
The concept of sensemaking, however, offers a stronger linkage to the role of material structure in prompting and bounding discourse. Sensemaking stresses the internal, self-conscious process of developing a coherent account of what is going on, while framing emphasizes the external, strategic process of creating specific meaning in line with political interests. 4 Framing and sensemaking thus focus on different aspects of the meaning-creation process. If framing focuses on whose meanings win out in symbolic contests, sensemaking shifts the focus to understanding why such frame contests come into being in the first place, as well as how they are connected to "hard" structural changes, and over which territory they are fought.
Combining insights from sensemaking with a framing approach acknowledges the role of structural factors but leaves discourse and framing open to symbolic, cultural, and political determinations. In other words, while "reality" provides some structural constraints, the autonomy of meaning and meaning creation remains. Our goal here is to favor neither materialistic accounts that see discourse as derived from and determined by economic circumstances, nor idealist accounts that see discourse as largely disconnected and detached from economic life. Instead we aim to examine how the discursive and material combine to create discourse embedded in larger structures. Such an approach does not deny agency but on the contrary shifts attention "away from what structures have done to actors to what actors do within the space produced by the limits and possibilities thrown up by structures" (Bartholomew and Mayer 1992:153) .
As an example of how framing and sensemaking combine to create the meaning of events, we examine the emergence and diffusion of the discourse of globalization in U.S. newspaper and press release coverage between 1984 and 1998. First, we show that there are changes in structural conditions, namely U.S.-global integration, that explain when discourse on globalization occurred and why its volume increased, pointing to sensemaking processes. Second, we show that as the discourse spread, T TH HE E D DI IS SC CO OU UR RS SE E O OF F G GL LO OB BA AL LI IZ ZA AT TI IO ON N----3 31 1 its "tone" shifted markedly and frame contests began as various actors aimed to influence interpretation of changes in accordance with their different interests. Third, we explain this shift in terms of the diversity of discursive actors as well as these actors' interests and positioning within the discourse.
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Since the appearance of the term "globalization" in the early 1970s, the scholarly and popular discourse of globalization has grown steadily in both amount and complexity. There is little consensus on what it does or should encompass, or even on the term's definition. For example, a negative perspective on globalization highlights its destructive effects-on democratic processes (Held 1995; Martin and Schuman 1997) , workers' rights (Tilly 1995) , the earth's natural resources (Shiva 2000) , and the authority of the nation-state (Cox 1996; Kennedy 1993; Kobrin 1997) . A second group of authors, more positively, proposes that growth in international trade leads to widely shared benefits and a generally civilizing effect (Levitt 1983; Ohmae 1990) . A third set challenges the reality of globalization, arguing that both its extent and effects have been vastly exaggerated (Doremus 1998; Hirst and Thompson 1996; Wade 1996) . A fourth group conceives globalization as a matter of degree, a process long under way but accelerated by the diffusion of new technology, information, practices, free capital, and transnational organizations (Boli and Thomas 1997; Guillén 2001; Sassen 1996; Sklair 1995) . Globalization has also been praised or condemned for increasing (Featherstone, Lash, and Robertson 1995) or decreasing (Hamelink 1994; Latouche 1995) cultural heterogeneity around the world. Finally, globalization has been characterized both as a condition of modernity (Beck 2000; Giddens 1990 ) and as ushering in a new and distinctly different "global age" (Albrow 1997) . 5 Globalization has thus become a grand contest of social constructions and an "umbrella construct" (Hirsch and Levin 1999) that enables conflicting claims to coexist and coevolve. Because the material facts at hand are ambiguous, the public discourse that develops to support and legitimate particular interpretations of these ambiguous data is of great importance. To illustrate this point, consider economic globalization, an area where there are plenty of supposedly hard data. The skeptical view-that its extent and importance are exaggerated-draws support from statistics showing that current flows of goods across borders are only slightly greater than during the "golden age" of trade before World War I (Hirst and Thompson 1996; Krugman 1994; Wade 1996 ). An opposing perspective-asserting globalization's strong effect-points to figures on the increasing mobility of financial capital and growing investments across national boundaries (Eichengreen 1996; Karunaratne and Tisdell 1996; Ohmae 1990) . Such contradictory conclusions illustrate how divergent interpretations of globalization can selectively cite and assert empirical support.
Precisely because globalization as a concept is poorly defined, it requires substantial interpretation. Discursive struggles over the interpretation of globalization, however, need to be examined alongside changes in the structure of the international economy. We therefore distinguish between globalization as a structural process and globalization as a symbolic discourse (cf. Chase Dunn, Kawano, and Brewer 2000; Dirlik 2000; Kayatekin and Ruccio 1998) . Research has mainly focused on the first aspect of globalization as a historical trend that can be measured by such structural changes as shifts in trade patterns or flows of capital. Much less attention has been devoted to the second aspect of globalization as a "discursive condition" (Franklin, Lury, and Stacey 2000) , and to specifying how the material process and symbolic construction of globalization are related.
G GL LO OB BA AL LI IZ ZA AT TI IO ON N A AN ND D T TH HE E M ME ED DI IA A Sensemaking about globalization and its effect on economic and social relations largely takes place within public discourse. Far from being the property of the social scientist, globalization is being defined by claims-making and contention in the public realm, exemplified through influential books by journalists such as Friedman (1999) , Klein (1999) , Greider (1997), and Danaher and Burbach (2000) . Journalists and public relations experts are "brokers" between social reality and public consciousness (Nelkin 1989) ; they organize stories in ways that provide meaning to related events and make sense out of real world cues and information (Andsager 2000; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Scheufele 1999) .
Similarly, studies of managerial discourse have argued for a linkage between symbolic systems and material practices (Bendix 1956; Guillén 1994) . For example, in their analysis of managerial discourse, Barley and Kunda (1992) showed how managerial theorizing has alternated between rational and normative discourses in parallel with broad cycles of economic expansion and contraction. Abrahamson (1996; also suggests that managerial discourse fluctuates as the result of both current performance gaps and long waves of macroeconomic activity. In fact, there appears to be broad agreement that waves of managerial discourse are connected to identifiable technical or economic issues (Abrahamson and Fairchild 1999; Edelman, Fuller, and Mara-Drita 2001) , although these structural issues do not determine content.
In drawing on these findings, we suggest similar mechanisms apply to the emergence of globalization discourse. We hypothesize that the discourse of globalization will be related to macroeconomic fluctuations, specifically to U.S. integration within the global economy. The logic follows Barley and Kunda (1992) and Abrahamson (1996) : changes in the economic or international competition create preferences for certain explanations that actors find useful in relation to problems created by these environmental changes. This nondeterminist argument proposes a "loose" coupling between specific problems and proposed explanations. The correlation of macroeconomic changes and public discourse on globalization emerges as a sensemaking response to new opportunities and highly uncertain developments. Note that our hypothesis relates to volume but not "pitch" of discourse, that is, it does not make assumptions about how the fluctuating discourse will evaluate integration with the global economy.
Since globalization does not affect all actors in a society evenly, a natural question is which actors find globalization a particularly coherent or attractive explanation of what is going on. To locate the emerging discourse on globalization more precisely and to embed it in concrete social relations, we draw on the concept of the discursive field (Bourdieu 1992; Spillman 1995; Wuthnow 1989 ). According to Wuthnow, the discursive field is a symbolic space that "provides the fundamental categories in which thinking can take place. It establishes the limits of discussion and defines the range of problems that can be addressed " (1989:13) . Discursive fields help actors organize their world and define "a space or field within which discourse can be framed " (1989:555) . They emerge from repeated patterns of social relations (Spillman 1995:148) . Discursive fields are thus constituted by and adapted to the everyday, grounded activity of their specif ic discursive communities.
If macroeconomic changes initiate sensemaking about globalization, then globalization discourse should emerge in those fields where such fluctuations are most prevalent and globalization is perceived to be the most advanced. One may conceive of these structural changes as forming "a pile of cues in need of some frame to organize them" (Weick 1999:41) , with "globalization" providing that very frame. We propose that the discourse of globalization should emerge first in discursive fields where everyday activity is most directly affected by macroeconomic changes, which is the financial sector, and foreign-exchange trading in particular (Helleiner 1994; Ohmae 1990; Walter 1988; Zaheer 1995) . The early globalization of the financial sector is illustrated by data on changes in the ratio of U.S. foreign-exchange turnover to total trade in goods (cf. Held et al. 1999) . While this ratio was already 21:1 in 1986, it had grown to 42:1 in 1992 and 55:1 in 1998 (Bank for International Settlements, various years; Federal Reserve Bank of New York 1986), suggesting that international integration grew much more rapidly in the financial sector as compared to trade in goods. We therefore hypothesize that the discourse of globalization will first emerge in the discursive field of finance.
Regarding the framing of the globalization discourse, what are the main views that dominate? Even a casual observer of "globalization" in the news media will have noticed the fierce debate over its apparent positive or negative effects that arose at the end of the 1990s. What accounts for this apparently widening dispute over the nature of globalization?
As the discourse of a phenomenon expands in volume, it also diffuses across discursive fields (Fishman 1978; Hilgartner and Bosk 1988) , which increases what Fairclough (1992) calls interdiscursivity: participants in one discursive field bring in terms from another. The more a discourse incorporates terms from elsewhere, the greater its interdiscursivity. The production of discourse, however, is regularly fraught with conflict (Coles 1998; Ferree et al. 2002; Gamson and Modigliani 1989) . The media in particular are "a site on which various social groups, institutions, and ideologies struggle over the definition and construction of [its] social reality" (Gurevitch and Levy 1985:19) . As a result, the extent of interdiscursivity and struggle over the construction of reality are connected: greater interdiscursivity allows agents to challenge existing understandings (Fairclough 1995) .
As the discourse of globalization diffuses across discursive fields, greater heterogeneity of discourse communities not only generates more points of view but also allows problems in these discursive fields to attach themselves to "globalization" as a sensemaking term. Accordingly, we hypothesize that the more heterogeneous the communities that employ "globalization" as an explanation, the more we should observe contention in framing by the actors in these fields.
D DA AT TA A A AN ND D M ME ET TH HO OD DS S
To analyze public discourse on globalization, we use a variety of primary and secondary sources, but most importantly a full-text dataset of newspaper articles and press releases addressing the topic. For the newspaper articles, we selected as sources the New York Times (NYT), the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), and the Washington Post (WP). These are arguably the most important newspapers in the United States and are known for their agenda-setting influence. For the press releases, we chose PR Newswire, the largest electronic distributor of news releases. PR Newswire contains the complete text of press releases from U.S. companies, government agencies, industry associations, labor unions, universities and colleges, human rights groups, and other organizations, thus offering a wide range of sources. It is particularly appropriate for an analysis of frames since these releases are especially designed for dissemination to the media and are stored in the original, unedited form (Miller 1997) .
Using the Dow Jones Interactive database, we extracted from these sources all newspaper articles and press releases that contained the word "globalization" or any of its derived forms, such as "globalize," "globalized," "globalizing," and "globality." After we removed duplicates, the newspaper segment of this dataset contained 1,805 documents, covering the period from January 1984 to December 1998. Before 1984, it is unlikely that "globalization" was featured in newspaper articles or press releases, since the term barely entered public discourse then. The press release segment contained 1,753 press releases. Data for PR Newswire are available as of the start of 1985, and this dataset therefore covers the time period from January 1985 to December 1998.
D DE EP PE EN ND DE EN NT T V VA AR RI IA AB BL LE ES S
The volume, location, and framing of globalization discourse are operationalized using three different dependent variables. To measure the volume of globalization discourse, we use annual and monthly counts of newspaper articles and press releases referring to "globalization" or its derived forms.
Location of the globalization discourse means the discursive field to which an article or press release belongs, operationalized as the sections of the newspaper. Each section limits the range of problems it addresses: for example, the finance section will usually not discuss sports events, and vice versa. With the exception of the general news and editorial sections, newspaper sections form fairly coherent fields, as their specialization is their reason for existing. Complete information on article sections was available for two publications (NYT and WP), accounting for 66 percent of the total 1,805 articles. Analyses of the role of discursive fields focus on this subset of articles. Separate analyses showed that this reduced dataset is representative of the full dataset across all other independent and dependent measures.
For press releases, we use industry membership of the issuing organization to define the boundaries of discursive fields (Anand and Peterson 2000; Creed and Scully 2000; Hoffman 2001) . Because industries tend to share important characteristics (such as their technology or the customers they sell to), we examine developments at a more aggregate level of major economic sectors, using codes provided by Dow Jones. For example, the "basic materials" market sector combines the producers of raw materials, such as commodity chemicals, steel, and mining, while the "technology" sector combines industries with frequent product changes because of scientific advances, such as aerospace, computers, and software. Furthermore, press releases issued by not-for-profit organizations, for which Dow Jones has no industry or market sector information, were coded into the following categories: unions, community and activist organizations, trade and employer associations, government entities, and educational institutions. These not-for-profit organizations accounted for about 9 percent of all press releases.
To assess the framing of globalization, we extracted from the newspaper articles and press releases all sentences containing the word "globalization" or its derivatives. We chose the sentence as the most meaningful unit of analysis because of its uncomplicated semantic structure and used computerized content analysis to detect the occurrence of frame key words in these sentences (Fan 1988; Miller 1997; Porac, Wade, and Pollock 1999) . This approach assumes that frames manifest themselves by the presence or absence of certain keywords and concepts (Entman 1991; Gamson et al. 1992 )-an actor's view will be marked by "a vocabulary of motives" or rationales for taking action (Benford 1993; Mills 1963) . We likewise assume that certain key concepts, consisting of different but conceptually synonymous lexical items, will cluster to denote the presence of a higher-order frame (Ferree et al. 2002; Porac, Wade, and Pollock 1999) . Through continuous cross-checking among the texts, we created coding categories that were increasingly refined to reveal a particular frame, resulting in fifteen key concepts that cluster into three higher-order, evaluative frames. 6 The negative frame depicts globalization as increasing the potential for economic crisis, threatening the livelihoods of workers, resulting in unemployment and poverty. For example, globalization may be seen as "thinning state power and responsibility, creating not only wealth but chaos and indifference" (WP, 8/28/98), as "the villain behind increased poverty, unemployment and inequality" (NYT, 2/9/97), or as "causing mass poverty and destroying the earth's ecology" (WSJ, 5/18/98) . This framing also points to an emerging resistance to globalization.
The neutral frame describes globalization as a natural, evolutionary, and largely inevitable development, characterized primarily by increasing cross-national flows of capital. For example, this frame suggests that the "globalization of equity investment was gathering momentum" (WSJ, 10/2/87), that "the issue of harmonizing banking rules has grown in importance with the globalization of financial markets" (WSJ, 9/30/87), and that "we no doubt will see dramatic changes in the [securities] industry brought about by the inevitable globalization of the marketplace" (AMEX Stock Exchange, 12/19/89).
Finally, the positive frame points to the potential gains and benefits of globalization. This frame suggests that "the globalization of our economy has provided us with new and exciting opportunities" (Dash Industries, 7/9/90), that "over all, the effects of globalization have been good" (WSJ, 2/8/98), and that modernization will allow U.S. firms "to take full advantage of opportunities arising from the globalized economy" (Citicorp, 7/13/89). After we established the validity of these frames, we coded the newspaper articles and press releases for the presence or absence of these frames.
I IN ND DE EP PE EN ND DE EN NT T V VA AR RI IA AB BL LE ES S
A central focus of our analysis is on how the material process of globalization affects its discourse. Regarding this material process, there is considerable evidence that over the past 25 years the American economy has become increasingly integrated with the global one (e.g., Chase Dunn et al. 2000; Hirst and Thompson 1996) . To measure this integration with the global economy, the three most important indicators used by the World Bank (2001) as well as others (Held et al. 1999 ; Hirst and Thompson
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1996) are foreign trade as a percentage of goods GDP, international private capital flows divided by GDP, and foreign direct investment divided by GDP. 7 All three indicators of economic globalization show significant increases since 1985. As an example, trade as a percentage of goods GDP increases from 42.8 percent in 1985 to 58.3 percent in 1991 and 73.6 percent in 1996.
To simplify the analysis of "structural" effects, and since we use these three indicators as reflecting a latent construct, we standardized them and combined them into an index of integration with the world economy, a procedure that has been frequently used in research on globalization (e.g., Agénor 2002; Dreher 2003; Milanovic 2002 ). This globalization index showed excellent reliability, with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.85. To confirm our measure, we conducted a factor analysis of the three indicators, which resulted in one factor that loaded positively and highly on all three variables (loadings ranged between .94 and .84) and accounted for 78 percent of the variance. The correlation between this factor and the globalization index was .99 and highly significant, which further confirmed this data reduction heuristic. Factor loadings and eigenvalues for this analysis are available from the ASR website.
To facilitate analysis of changes over time, we created a periodization based on two key events affecting both process and discourse of globalization. The first event is the U.S. stock market crash in 1987, which marked a turning point for global financial markets (Tesar and Werner 1998) and created attention for their increasing interdependence due to globalization (OECD 1991; Baylis and Smith 2001) . The second event is the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on January 1, 1995, which created a permanent institution for advancing and enforcing global trade agreements (Held et al. 1999; Hoekman and Kostecki 1995) . The WTO has also become one of the major points of contention in the globalization discourse. The year 1995 is furthermore convenient since it marks the beginning of a large-scale antiglobalization movement (Klein 1999:330-35) . We thus created dummy variables for period I (1984 I ( -87), period II (1988 , and period III .
We also created variables to measure diversity within and across discursive fields. To measure diversity within discursive fields, we used dummy variables, assuming the general news and editorial sections to be more heterogeneous than most other sections. Thus we expect a negative framing to occur significantly more often in these sections. As a measure of across-field diversity, we computed a diversity index for each year. The index is defined as an inverse Herfindahl index (a widely used measure of concentration) calculated by squaring the share each section has of the total discourse and then summing those squares. The formula for our index is as follows:
The index ranges from zero to one, with "0" indicating concentration of the discourse in a single section, and "1" indicating that the discourse is distributed evenly across all sections. For example, if all articles mentioning globalization occurred in only two equal sections, the value of the diversity index would be 1 -(0.5 2 + 0.5 2 ) = 1 -(0.25 + 0.25) = 0.5.
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Since we examine three different dependent variables (volume, location, and framing of the discourse), our analysis proceeds in three steps that employ different statistical procedures.
In the first step, we model the volume of globalization discourse using negative binomial regression. This model is appropriate when predicting a non-negative count variable such as the number of article and press releases (Long 1990 (Long , 1997 . To control for the overall level of discourse, we include the total number of newspaper articles and press releases per year. Since it is possible that the overall state of the econ- omy will influence discourse about greater U.S.-global integration, we control in our analyses for the general level of economic activity using the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) index. 8 We furthermore control for time using a continuous variable. Since the globalization and general economic indicators were highly correlated with time, we residualized these measures by regressing them on the linear time variable and then subtracting their predicted values from their actual values, leaving them with only their unique variation while assigning all confounded variation to the time variable. This method provides conservative estimates for our substantive variables but avoids multicollinearity problems.
In the second step, we estimate a series of logistic regression models to analyze the location where globalization discourse emerged. The dependent variable is the respective newspaper section or market sector in which a globalization-related article or press release appeared, with all other sections/sectors serving as the reference category. The independent variables of interest are the periods in which articles appeared, with period III (1995-98) serving as the reference category. We report robust standard errors using the Huber/White sandwich estimator (White 1980) . Standard errors are corrected for repeated observations from the same newspapers. To control for the baseline frequency of a section or sector, we include its volume as a percentage of the total discourse in that medium per year. All models again control for the overall levels of U.S.-global integration and economic activity. As a measure of overall interest in globalization, the models also control for the number of books on globalization published annually. We collected these data from the Books in Print database. 9
In the third step, we use multinomial logistic regressions to predict the occurrence of the three frames in newspaper articles and press releases (cf. Miller and Denham 1996) . We estimate the effect of discursive fields using newspaper section and market sector dummies. To control for the effect of structural changes on the framing of globalization, we include the globalization index and the NYSE index in the models. Furthermore, to guard against the possibility that changes in frame prevalence were the result of more academic works on globalization infiltrating public discourse, we again control for the annual number of books published on globalization. The models also control for time and publication effects.
R RE ES SU UL LT TS S
For the volume of discourse, we find a substantial increase in awareness of globalization in the United States. As shown in Figure 1 , the discourse of globalization emerged in the early 1980s, showed a slight peak around 1989-90, and then receded again to previous levels. By 1995, however, the number of newspaper articles and press releases referring to globalization began to increase exponentially, both in raw counts and as a percentage of the total discourse. Also, while the percentage of press releases exceeds that of newspaper articles for most of the study period, the pattern remains largely the same for both.
D DI IS SC CO OU UR RS SE E A AN ND D S ST TR RU UC CT TU UR RA AL L C CH HA AN NG GE E
Our first hypothesis anticipated that the volume of globalization discourse would rise in relation to increased integration of the United States within the global economy. Table 1 reports the results of negative binomial regression models predicting the number of newspaper articles and press releases per month that relate to globalization. Descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables used here and in further analyses are available from the ASR website.
Our findings show that material process and public sensemaking of globalization are indeed coupled. As predicted, the coefficient for the T TH HE E D DI IS SC CO OU UR RS SE E O OF F G GL LO OB BA AL LI IZ ZA AT TI IO ON N----3 37 7 8 We considered a number of alternative measures, namely the Nasdaq-100 Index, the Dow Jones Industrial Average, and NYSE trading volume. All these measures of economic activity, however, are correlated at .98 and above, and using them leads to essentially identical results.
9 As alternative measures, we also collected data on the number of academic articles mentioning globalization in four other databases: Sociofile, EconLit, PAIS, and Historical Abstracts (cf. Guillén 2001 of economic activity. 10 These results confirm the hypothesized positive association between the structural and discursive elements of globalization.
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We suggested that globalization discourse would emerge first in the discursive fields of finance. Table 2 shows descriptive data on the distribution of globalization discourse across discursive fields, confirming this hypothesis. During period I, the vast majority (73 percent) of newspaper articles dealing with globalization appeared in the financial news section. Another 9 percent appeared in the general news section, and the remaining 18 percent in the editorial, book, and other sections. Period II shows a slight decrease in the number of articles appearing in the financial news section, but it clearly remains the dominant section. This changes significantly in period III, which is marked by the diffusion of the term across a variety of discursive fields. In this period, only 26 percent of the articles appear in the financial news section, whereas both the general news and the editorial sections have grown substantially, increasing to 23 and 29 percent of all articles, respectively. The percentage of articles appearing in all other sections has also increased, now making up about 17 percent of total coverage. 11 Using the diversity
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10 The pattern of positive, significant relationships also holds for the individual components of our index, with the exception of the coefficient for private capital flows in the newspaper dataset and the coefficient for gross foreign direct investment in the press release dataset, which are in the predicted direction but do not reach significance. 11 The diffusion of the term across different areas of discourse is also apparent when examining the heterogeneity of this residual category. During period I, only five different sections appeared in this category. In period II, the number of sections had increased to fourteen, and in period III some seventeen sections are combined in this category, including the Automobile, Cultural, Food, Education, Health, Real Estate, Science, Sports, and Travel. index as an alternative measure of increasing diffusion, the index for newspaper discourse likewise increased from a value of .32 in period I to a value of .52 in period II and .79 in period III. Table 3 reports the results of the logistic regression models predicting the location of discourse in newspapers, confirming our findings. Articles mentioning globalization from period I have a significantly greater likelihood of being published in the finance section, using period III as the reference category. This is still true for articles published in period II, but the coefficient is slightly smaller, though still significant. In contrast, articles published in periods I and II are significantly less likely to appear in the news or editorial sections as compared with period III.
A similar pattern emerges for the press release dataset, but diffusion appears to proceed somewhat more rapidly than in the newspaper sections. As Table 2 shows, almost half of all press releases during period I came from financial firms, making the financial sector clearly the dominant one. In period II, that share had declined to 21 percent, and in period III only 12 percent of press releases came from financial firms. By period II, we already see a fairly wide diffusion of globalization discourse across market sectors, with the largest increases in the industrial sector. Period III is marked by widespread diffusion, with no dominant sector. This development is again mirrored in the diversity index for press releases, which increased from .70 in period I to .83 in period II, and to .85 in period III. Examining press releases by industry shows an even more pronounced trend, with the number of distinct industries increasing from 22 in period I to 78 in period II, and to over 100 in period III. Note also that the residual category again shows significant increases, which came mostly from more press releases by government, educational institutions, conglomerates, and utilities firms, as well as trade and employer associations. Overall this remains very much a "corporate" discourse, however, as press releases issued by community and activist organizations accounted for only about 8 percent of all releases in the third period.
Logistic regression models again confirmed that press releases from periods I and II are significantly more likely to be issued by organi- After considering volume and location of the globalization discourse, we now examine in more detail the contexts surrounding its emergence and the related prevalence of different framings of globalization. Figures 2a and 2b graphically show the prevalence of the three frames in newspapers and press releases using three-year moving averages. The association of "globalization" with finance, presented with a largely neutral or positive framing, continued to dominate discourse on globalization throughout period II (1988-94) , with the exception of a few doubts raised in newspapers after the stock market crash of 1987. The appearance of the term also expanded beyond the financial sector, attracting a positive association with other industries, such as airlines, chemical, and automobiles. Negative evaluations of globalization emerged as an important theme only in the mid-1990s, when newspapers in particular began to discuss the adverse effects of globalization in such diverse areas as job losses, cultural homogenization, public health, and international crime. Table 4 provides an overview of the three periods in the discourse of globalization. With these broad developments as a background, we now turn to a more detailed discussion of the three periods.
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Since the early 1980s, monetary deregulation and technological change have greatly increased international financial flows (Held et al. 1999) . A seminal development was the "Big Bang," the liberalization of the London stock exchange in October 1986, which soon led a number of other stock exchanges in Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Norway to liberalize their trading systems in similar ways. The understanding of globalization in this period mostly depicted global integration as inescapable. For example, the liberalization of the London stock exchange was frequently described as a logical step, initiated by a prudent government that "recognized that the globalization of financial markets was an irresistible force" (NYT, 12/11/85). The forces identified as driving the globalization of financial markets-greater integration of the major nations' economies, advances in communications and computer technology, and deregulation of financial markets-were seen as a "trend towards globalization that is irreversible" (NYT, 12/16/87). Figures 2a and 2b show the prevalence of this neutral framing in newspaper and press release discourse. Until 1989, the neutral frame was 4 42 2----A AM ME ER RI IC CA AN N S SO OC CI IO OL LO OG GI IC CA AL L R RE EV VI IE EW W the dominant, albeit declining, frame in newspaper articles and press releases. Both media primarily depicted globalization as a natural development and part of a more general process of technological advancement. Resistance was largely seen as futile and attempts to regulate the globalization as detrimental to national interests (WSJ, 8/6/87). Newspaper articles and press releases regularly depicted globalization as a fact of "reality," brought about mainly by technology and innovation, so "it cannot be reversed in any material way by regulation or legislation" (WP, 7/26/87). While a low level of contestation had been present in globalization discourse from the start, it was not until the end of 1987 that themes of containment and control took on greater importance. On October 19, 1987, the stock market on Wall Street collapsed. For the discourse of globalization, the ensuing losses in international financial markets were perceived as a serious setback to the idea of globalization. Newspaper articles in particular began to voice concerns about markets spinning out of control, and the trend toward "globalization" and the interconnectedness of international financial markets were identified as the main reason for the severity of the crisis (e.g. WP, 11/20/87). The f inancial community also saw the October crash as "a bloody nose for the whole idea of globalization" and globalization as having "lost a lot of its steam" (WSJ, 9/23/88). The World Bank treasurer, Donald Roth, suggested that "people got carried away with the rhetoric of globalization" (WSJ, 3/29/88). But even though the crash slowed globalization discourse, it left the framing of globalization as an irreversible process largely unchanged: the trend toward global integration of markets had gone too far to be reversed (NYT, 12/16/87). Calls for tighter regulation of the stock market also subsided as major figures such as Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, suggested that large-scale interference with the globalization of financial markets would harm national interests, since "excessive regulation could lead to a drain of business out of the country" (NYT, 12/1/88). In the early 1990s, concerns over globalization continued to fade, and the trend toward international trade and interconnectedness again seemed natural and inevitable, but the prominence of this neutral framing of globalization declined during this period.
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In press release discourse, we observe a somewhat different picture. Company press releases paid significantly less attention to the stock market crash but continued to depict globalization as unavoidable. A Salomon Brothers report on global equity investment strategies sums up this view by suggesting that "the trend toward globalization has survived intact and has perhaps been strengthened by the market's collapse" (Salomon Brothers, 12/10/87). Other press releases similarly stressed that globalization is "inevitable" (AMEX, 12/10/89; Mazda, 5/10/90; Reichold Chemicals, 4/4/88), "inexorable" (Chartered WestLB, 10/24/91), and "a fact of life" (Land O'Lakes, 2/24/94; Time Warner, 4/11/91). At the same time, a positive framing of globalization strengthened, and a growing number of firms began to point to the perceived benefits of a global economy. Press releases increasingly portrayed globalization as offering increased opportunities for growth The third discourse period is marked by diffusion of globalization discourse across a number of different industries and increasing contestation in newspaper articles. Since 1995, a growing anti-globalization movement had been forming, bringing together a broad spectrum of interests and culminating in the disruptive protests that characterized the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) conference in Seattle. While press releases continued to depict globalization as a positive or at least neutral development, newspapers began to emphasize the
T TH HE E D DI IS SC CO OU UR RS SE E O OF F G GL LO OB BA AL LI IZ ZA AT TI IO ON N----4 43 3
Delivered by Ingenta to : University of Southern California Wed, 25 Oct 2006 18:07:00 negative effects of globalization, pointing to increasing unemployment, corporate downsizing, decreasing workers' rights, and rising poverty, as well as growing popular resistance to globalization.
The most important theme in the growing negative framing of globalization is the erosion of wages and living standards of American workers. Faced with untamed globalization, American workers increasingly "get caught up in the job-churning" of international competition and are "driven into poorer-paying jobs" (NYT, 11/13/97), particularly from such trade liberalization as the NAFTA agreement. The "relentless erosion of worker's rights" that goes with globalization "dampens demand for higher pay" and "leaves many workers feeling insecure" (NYT, 10/20/97; WSJ, 11/11/97). Globalization is framed as reducing the benefits to workers and their families from economic growth, turning them into victims of a "globalization with pauperization" (WP, 2/29/96).Another theme stresses the negative consequences of globalization stemming from a growing homogenization of culture and consumption, with the untamed market forces leading to the "death of national culture" (NYT, 2/11/97) and the emergence of an undifferentiated world culture: a "globalization of cooking" (NYT, 11/7/96), a global television and advertising culture (WP, 10/17/98; WSJ, 9/24/98), and even loss of the "European model of civilization" (NYT, 9/21/97).
The picture that emerges from Figures 2a and 2b shows a striking divergence between newspaper and press release discourse. In both media, we observe the same initial dominance and then decline of the neutral framing of globalization. In newspapers, however, the negative framing emerges as the most important frame at the end of the observation period, but among press releases a positive framing of globalization predominates. Table 5 reports the results of the multinomial logit models predicting occurrence of frames in newspaper articles and press releases. Model 1 shows the baseline model for newspaper articles with control variables only. The time coefficients confirm that prevalence of a negative framing increases significantly over time, while that of a neutral framing decreases significantly. There are also differences in coverage among newspapers. Using the WSJ as a reference category, the model shows that the NYT and the WP are significantly more likely to carry articles on the negative aspects of globalization.
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Model 2 shows results for the reduced set of articles for which complete information on newspaper sections was available (NYT and WP). Regarding within-category diversity of discursive fields, we find support for our hypothesis. The coefficients for the news and editorial sections-the two most heterogeneous sections-are positive and significant, indicating that a negative framing of globalization indeed occurred significantly more often in those sections than in all other sections. Pieces in the editorial section, in particular, emphasized the negative aspects of globalization, while articles in the news section were equally likely to carry any one of the three frames. This finding reflects the role of the editorial section as a place for normative claims about current affairs, while the news section presents a more dispassionate account that includes the diverging views of all actors commenting on globalization. 12 A neutral framing of globalization, on the other hand, occurred significantly more often in the financial section, supporting our previous finding that the neutral framing of globalization emerged in finance. The results of model 2 also support our assumption that greater discourse heterogeneity across discursive fields increases the likelihood of a negative framing. As predicted, the coefficient for the diversity index is positive and significant.
While heterogeneity within and across discursive fields is associated with a negative framing of globalization, note that we find this effect in the absence of a surge in press releases from anti-globalization organizations. In separate analyses, we confirmed that a negative framing of press releases was not a significant predictor of a negative framing in newspaper articles. This suggests that editorial sections did not merely reflect claims made in press releases from the counter-globalization movement. Instead, it points to a more active sensemaking process that reflects how actors across a variety of domains connect globalization with issues of workers' rights, environmental degradation, and cultural homogenization. Note also that structural factors show little ability to explain frame occurrence. With the exception of the correlation between the globalization index and a negative framing, neither the measure of globalization nor that of overall economic activity are significant predictors of frame occurrence, indicating that the discursive framing of change is not explained by the structural changes in the economy, but rather emerges from the diversity in discursive actors and their diverging interests in relation to globalization. Model 3 presents the results for the press release data. For press releases, however, we do not observe a robust relationship between discourse heterogeneity and negative frame prevalence. One probable reason is reluctance by corporations to discuss negative events in press releases, as reflected in fewer negative terms in their discourse. To compare more closely the effect of discursive fields on frame prevalence in press releases, the model shows the effect for the financial market sector and the non-corporate sector, using the remaining sectors as the reference category. The model indicates that firms in the financial sector are significantly more likely to issue press releases exhibiting a neutral framing. In contrast, press releases from non-corporate actors such as unions or community and activist organizations are significantly more likely to contain a negative framing of globalization. This finding further demonstrates how the framing of globalization is not determined by structural factors alone, but instead depends on the social position of actors involved in discursive contests. Finally, we note that the performance of the logit model, particularly for predicting a positive framing of globalization, is not very good, indicating thatexcept for finance-positive discourse on globalization seems not to be determined by the discursive fields of market sectors or by the overall performance of the economy.
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While previous research in the framing perspective has mainly focused on the strategies of different actors engaged in framing contests, our study has argued that more attention needs to be paid to the interpretive sensemaking that enables the expansion and diffusion of framing discourse in the first place. By integrating insights from the sensemaking literature into a framing perspective, our approach provides a fuller account of the social construction of reality in public discourse, showing how explanatory scripts and frames emerge in fields where everyday practice comes to adopt them as sensible accounts. We have shown that contextual and structural factors, such as economic changes, are quite strong in predicting when discourse will occur and increase in volume. These factors also help explain where discourse first emerges and how it spreads across discursive fields, gathering momentum and inviting contestation as actors with different interests become involved. While these structural changes set the stage and open up opportunities for meaning creation, the discursive contests that subsequently emerge are by no means predetermined by them. Rather, this discourse and its intensity of contention result from the active, interested meaning creation by different actors vying for support for their respective positions. In the case of globalization, a varied discursive landscape emerged in which the structural and discursive factors combined to create assorted domains of meaning, with actors in some discursive fields supporting a positive framing, while others emphasized a negative or neutral framing.
The current study opens up several promising perspectives for future research on structure and discourse. While elite U.S. newspaper and press release coverage was our focus of analysis, there are other potentially relevant sources and mediators of public discourses not examined here. These include television news (Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Wood and Peake 1998) , congressional committees (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988) , and, increasingly, such electronic media as the Internet. Research on intermedia agenda setting (Mazur and Lee 1993; Trumbo 1995) suggests that the emergence and diffusion of discourse in these media may well follow similar patterns. However, to learn more about their role in framing issues and discourse, more research is needed on how the various media differ in terms of their discursive opportunity structure (Ferree et al. 2002; Koopmans and Statham 2000) and how such differences may benefit or disadvantage various actors and framings. Further questions along this line include: what is the relationship between discourses in different media? Does frame emergence in one medium lead or lag that in another? If journalists are at the same time both disseminators and audiences for frames (Fishman 1980; Scheufele 1999) , how does framing discourse emerge and move through different media?
Regarding globalization, the current paper has shown that initially frame prominence in newspaper articles and press releases was quite similar, but as the discourse developed, different frames achieved dominance in these media. An important question here is whether this increasing contention of globalization in newspaper articles is perhaps related to a growing activity of non-corporate actors using press releases and electronic media (Keck and Sikkink 1998) . In keeping with the classic concerns of the framing perspective, one might ask which actors successfully introduced a negative framing into public discourse and why they succeeded. While our study has focused mainly on the structural factors in which a framing discourse is embedded, future work may shift the focus to the identities and strategies of the actors engaged in framing contests over globalization.
Additional research should also examine more closely the narratives that emerge as the result of sensemaking processes in newspapers, and particularly in the editorial sections. For example, how is editorial sensemaking related to stories in the financial and news sections? What is the lag time of editorial coverage in respect to these sections, and how do different framings enter and interact with coverage in other discursive fields? Furthermore, how is this process embedded in organizational constraints (e.g., Demers 1996) , resulting in differences both within and across newspapers? How does newspaper discourse of globalization differ in smaller versus larger cities, and how do such differences relate to editorial attention cycles and the intensity or uniqueness of events covered (Myers and Caniglia 2004) ? Answers to these questions would help us gain a fuller understanding of how sensemaking and framing play out in the news media.
Another fruitful avenue of research concerns the relationship between media frames and reader opinion. Previous studies of media coverage on public opinion strongly suggest that media frames become part of the public's tool kit in making sense of public affairs (Andsager 2000; Gamson 1988; McCombs, Einsiedel and Weaver 1991; Pan and Kosicki 1993) , but more remains to be learned on how this process plays out. Regarding public opinion on globalization, there are unfortunately no continuous data for our time period. The earliest polls mentioning globalization were conducted for the Americans Talk Issues Foundation, which found that the percentage of Americans who believed globalization to be negative had risen from 9 to 14 percent between 1991 and 1993, while the percentage of those who believed it to be positive remained the same at 41 percent (Program on International Policy Attitudes 2000:4). A different poll in 1998 found that the number of those who believed globalization to be mostly bad had risen to 20 percent while the number of those who believed it to be mostly good had risen to 54 percent (Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 2000). While these do not make up enough data points to allow a reliable estimate of changes, they do support our claim that globalization has become more contested. It also appears that Americans became more opinionated on globalization. In 1993, more than 40 percent of respondents said they were not familiar with the concept of globalization, but in 1998 only 11 percent did not provide an opinion when asked whether globalization was good or bad.
Our findings furthermore speak to a critical "project" conception of globalization as a political-economic construct promoted mainly by financial actors and institutions, with the idea of the free market at its center (e.g., McMichael 2000; Soros 2002; Stiglitz 2003) . This conception suggests that neo-liberal rhetoric of market liberalization masks the negative political and social consequences of globalization, especially relating to labor and the environment. In this study, we have traced the developing discourse of globalization rather than examine whether structural globalization has mainly negative, neutral, or positive effects for the world at large or for the United States in particular. Without engaging in the debate over the "true" nature of globalization, our findings show how the neutral frame that developed in the finance community and dominated globalization discourse throughout the 1980s is being replaced by a discourse on both its negative and positive effects. The mobilization of an anti-globalization movement and the proliferation of protest events such as those during the WTO conference in Seattle in 1999 would indicate that the negative framing of globalization has strengthened since the end of our study period. At the current time, however, the outcome of the frame contest over globalization is still largely undecided.
Future research should also continue to examine the important role of agency and how culture, structure, and situated action interact in shaping understandings and contention in different national contexts (e.g., Ferree et al. 2002; Pieterse 2003) . Using the example of globalization, it would be particularly informative to examine its discourse in countries that occupy different locations in the global arrangements of power. Are there differences in how globalization is framed in economically developed nations such as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, or in emerging markets such as Malaysia and Indonesia, which have at times equated globalization with the imposition of a new economic world order that favors industrialized players? One suspects so. Such international comparisons would help us better to understand the relationship between the framing of transformative events and the wider symbolic order of societies. If framing an issue depends on cultural resonance, as stressed by a number of authors (e.g., Diani 1996; Kubal 1998) , then analyzing framing discourses should show national differences that reflect differing life situations and symbolic repertoires. These suggestions for further research invite more studies of framing and sensemaking on contested issues with alternative frames and interpretations competing for legitimacy and public support. Our study of discourse on globalization provides but one example. 
